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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT
OF 1HE
STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and AP'Pellant,
vs.
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, as State
Engineer of the State of Utah;
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS
ASSOCIATION, a corporation; UTAH
LAKE DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a
corporation; KENNECOTT COPPER
CORPORATION, a corporation;
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a public corporation
of the State of Utah; PROVO
RESERVOIR WATER USERS COMP ANY,
a corporation; HUGH McKELLAR,
as Provo Water Commissioner;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Bureau of Reclamation, Department of
Interior; and SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation of the State of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12,647

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STkTEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action filed pursuant to Section 73-3-14, Utah
Code Annotated 1953 to review in part the Decision
of defendant Hubert C. Lambert, as State Engineer,
dated May 1, 1970, embodying his directive to defendant Hugh McKellar as Provo River Water Commissioner to deliver to plaintiff and appellant, Provo
City, water from the Provo River under paragraph
4 ( c) of the "Provo River Decree" only when Provo
1

City can utilize the 16.5 second feet of flow specified
therein for a non-consumptive power use.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to 'the trial court on
mutual Motions For Summary Judgment. The lower
court denied plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment and made and entered a Summary Judgment
in favor of defendants collectively, affirming the Decision of Hubert C. Lambert as State Engineer, dated
May 1, 1970, and adjudging that the award to Provo
City under paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree is for power use only and shall be delivered to
Provo City only when it can utilize said flow for a
non-consumptive power use.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents collectively seek to affirm in all respects the Summary Judgment made and entered by
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the substance of appellant's Statement Of Facts insofar as it summarizes
the proceedings in this case before the lower court.
However, appellant makes no reference to the foundational facts which led to the Findings Of Fact and
Decree in Civil 2888 and which are the bases of the
Summary Judgment made and entered by the trial
court herein. Accordingly, respondents make the following statement summarizing those foundational
facts established by the record herein as a supplement to appellant's Statement Of Facts.
2

But first to simplify matters, the following
nomenclature will be used throughout the remainder
of this Brief. The reference Civil 2888 shall encompass the entire proceedings before the District Court
of Utah County in that certain action entitled '''Provo Reservoir Company, a corporation, plaintiff, vs.
Provo City, et al, defendants." Provo River Decree
is the final Decree made and entered on May 2, 1921
in Civil 2888 by C. W. Morse, Presiding Judge and
Judge pro tern. Plaintiff and appellant, Provo City,
shall be referred to as Provo City. Defendants and
respondents named above shall be referred to collectively as defendants. Defendant Hubert C. Lambert
as State Engineer of the State of Utah shall be referred to as State Engineer; and the defendant Hugh
McKellar as Provo River Water Commissioner shall
be referred to as Water Commissioner.
Now as to the foundational facts. In May, 1917,
during the pendency of the trial of Civil 2888, the
outline of the proposed distribution of water to Provo City for 1917 into the factory race provided for
13.75 second feet from June 30 to July 20 and 14.00
second feet from July 20 to September 1, with no irrigation thereunder, in a category separate and apart
from the irrigation of the Provo City acreage and
lots (R. 92, 93).
The Decision of C. W. Morse, Judge pro tern,
dated November 26, 1917 awarded to Provo City during the irrigation season 13.75 second feet of water
for power purposes theretofore used by the mill
3

ri'ghts upon the factory race and other races within
the City ( R. 98) separate from its a ward to Provo
City for power purposes during the non-irrigating
season (R. 98) and separate and apart from its
award to Provo City of the waters for irrigation purposes for the Provo City farm acres and town lots ( R.
94, 95, 100). The Decision also fixed the basis of
assessment to Provo City as a power user for its mill
rights along the factory race (R. 99).
By stipulation in open court on September 4,
1918 between the Provo Reservoir Company and Provo City the foregoing 13.75 second feet was changed
to 16.5 second feet and was there specifically identified as "the power right water" (R. 101, 103).
Mr. F. S. Richards, then attorney for Provo City
(R. 104), subsequently offered evidence to show that
the 13. 75 second feet would not turn the machinery
of the mills and that 16.5 second feet was essential for
that purpose in support of the stipulation substituting the 16.5 second feet for the 13.75 second feet (R.
105-108, incl.).
T. F. Wentz, then Provo River Water Commissioner, in testifying to the distribution of the waters
under the tentative decree, differentiated between
the waters delivered for irrigation purposes and the
waters delivered to the factory race for power purposes (R. llOA).
During the post 1917 Decision proceedings the
trial court noted that its award of 50 or 57 acre (per
4

second foot) duty was an abundant award ( R. 142,
143) and thereafter denied Provo City's motion to
re-open the case with reference to the duty of water
because of its exceedingly generous allowance of water (R. 144, 145).
The above award of 16.5 second feet of water
was incorporated into paragraph 58 (c) of the Findings Of Fact of Civil 2888 dated May 2, 1921 as a
right separate and apart from the irrigation rights
of Provo City under paragraphs 58(a) and 58(b)
thereof (R. 113, 115). Likewise said 16.5 second feet
was incorporated into the final Decree of Civil 2888
dated May 2, 1921 as paragraph 4 ( c) as a right during the irrigation season separate and apart from
the power right during the non-irrigation season under paragraph 4 ( d) and separate from the irri·gation
rights of Provo City under paragraphs 4(a) and
4 (b) thereof (R. 116,129).
The assessment of Provo City for its power
rights along the factory race was incorporated into
paragraph 169 of the Findings Of Fact (R. 114) and
paragraph 130 of the Decree (R. 128), both dat:ed
May 2, 1921, in Civil 2888.
On the basis of the foregoing record the court
below denied plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 202) and made and entered a Summary
Judgment in favor of defendants collectively, affirming the Decision of the State Engineer dated May 1,
1970 and adjudging that the award to Provo City
5

under paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree is
for power use only and shall be delivered to Provo
City only when it can utilize said flow for a non-consumptive power use ( R. 204-206, incl.).
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESOR'TED
TO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE RECORD OF
CIVIL 2888 PRESENTED TO IT BY THE PARTIES HEREIN TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF PARAGRAPH 4(c) OF THE PROVO
RIVER DECREE.

At the pretrial conference the parties stipulated
that only those portions of the record of Civil 2888
presented to the trial court in support of their respective Motions would constitute the record in this
case (Tr. 18) and only those portions extracted '
would be material to the issues in this case (Tr. 17).
All parties were free to extract from the record of
Civil 2888 whatever portions thereof they deemed
relevant herein and were afforded the opportunity
to file objections thereto (Tr. 13). Pursuant to the
procedure agreed upon, the defendants collectively
filed their Motion For Summary Judgment on the
grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law (R. 88-91, incl.). Defendants supported their Motion with certified copies of portions
of the record in Civil 2888 (R. 92-129, incl.; 140145, incl.; 197-199, incl.).
1

Likewise Provo City filed its Motion For Summary Judgment upon the ground and for the reason
6

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and as a matter of law plaintiff was entitled to judgment as requested in said Motion (R. 130-133, incl.).
Plaintiff also supported its Motion with certified copies of portions of the record in Civil 2888 (R. 158195, incl.).
Both sides, having sought an interpretation of
paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree, laid the
controversy in the lap of the trial court by filing
mutual Motions For Summary Judgment. Mastic
Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v. Acme Distributing
Co., 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). And both
sides having specifically represented to the court that
no genuine issues of fact exist, it was proper for the
court to decide the matter by summary judgment.
Diamond T Utah Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 (1968); Robinson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation,
22 Utah 2d 163, 450 P.2d 91 (1969); annotation 36
A.L.R. 2d 881, Section 4 (a), pages 901-905, incl.
Furthermore, the construction or interpretation of a
Judgment presents a question of law for the court.
Callan v. Callan (Wash.), 468 P.2d 456 (1970).
Provo City now argues under Point III of its
Brief tha:t paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree
is not ambiguous and, therefore, this Court should
resort to no other source in arriving at its interpretation of the meaning. Such position is contrary to
the position taken by it in the trial court. There Provo City requested the trial court to resort to those

r

portions of the Findings Of Fact and the record in
Civil 2888 which it there presented in support of itB
Motion For Summary Judgment and made a part of
the record of this case as the basis for its interpretati'on of paragraph 4 ( c). Furthermore, Provo City
sought to support its Motion with a wholly objectionable Affidavit from its Mayor, Verl C. Dixon (R.
134-136, incl.), which was properly stricken by the
trial court (R. 201, 202). And Provo City filed a
Motion to file additional documentation outside of
the record in Civil 2888 and taken from the files of
the State Engineer's office to further support its Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 146-154, incl.).,
which was also properly denied (R. 155,156). Nor
did Provo City file objections to any of the documentation from the record of Civil 2888 filed by defendants in support of their Motion For Summary Judgment and made a part of the record in this case. Having gambled and lost, Provo City cannot now be heard
to argue before this Oourt that the Provo River Decree contains no ambiguity whatever and urge that
this Court should not look beyond the language of
paragraph 4 ( c).
We say that paragraph 4 ( c) is ambiguous, as
did the trial court (Tr. 10). The ambiguity is pointed up as follows:
(1) The first sentence thereof does not state the

specific use for which the water is awarded;

(2) The second sentence thereof refers to past uses
8

for irrigation purposes by Provo City and for
the generation of power by the companies and
persons named therein; and
(3) The third sentence thereof specifically provides that the said use for power purposes has
been under license and grant from Provo City.
I

As to ( 1) above, Provo City argues on page 11
of its Brief that the first sentence of paragraph 4(c)
constitutes an outright grant of 16.5 second feet of
water to Provo City without any limitation as to the
nature of its use. We say there can be no such water
right since it is a cardinal principle of our water law
that beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the
limit of all rights to the use of water in this state.
Section 73-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Big Cottonwood Lower Canal v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 P.
454 (1929); Little Cottonwood Water Company v.
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930). This principle has always been the law in this state, and the
statutory declaration thereof (Section 73-1-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953) is merely declaratory of the
pre-existing law. Whitmore v. Salt Lake City, 89
Utah 387, 57 P.2d 726 (1936); Sigurd City v. State,
105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
As to (2) above, Provo City contends on page 12
of its Brief that such language appears to be intended
as a limitation on the outright grant by stating that
the water had previously been used for irrigation
purposes by the City. Such argument concedes the am9

biguity. We say that had it been intended to award
such water for irrigation purposes the number of
acres to be irrigated and the duty would have been
specified and the flow for that purpose would have
been based thereon rather than the fixed quantity of
16.5 second feet, as is done under appellant's irrigation rights under paragraph 4 (a..) and paragraph
4 ( b) thereof and as is done under all of the other
Class A irrigation rights (R. 116-127, incl., 193)
save and except for the John D. Dixon and John C.
Whiting Provo Canyon Rights (R. 194).
As to (3) above, Provo City does not even attempt to explain the meaning thereof. We say that
·such language confirms the award for power purposes in the name of Provo City as a power right.
We submit that the ambiguity of paragraph
4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree is obvious and is
again conceded by Provo City on page 14 of its Brief,
wherein it suggests that the court look to the Findings Of Fact for clarification, followed by its statement on page 15 of its Brief that Finding 58(c) (R.
113) places no limitation whatever on its ownership
except for the legal inference resulting from the second sentence thereof. That being so, it is not only
proper but necessary that the court resort to the record underlying the Provo River Decree to ascertain
the meaning of paragraph 4 ( c). This Court stated
the rule in Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Company, 82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281 (1932) on page 283
of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
10

"In construing the decree it is proper to
refer to the pleadings in the case, and the issues joined thereunder, in order to explain and
limit the language used in the decree."
The general rule of construction is well stated in 4.6
Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, pa:ge 364 as follows:
'·'A judgment which is ambiguous and uncertain may be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly. Where,
on the whole record, the scope of the judgment
can be ascertained, it will be construed in accordance with that record as influenced by the
applicable statutes and rules of procedure, and
by the character and object of the proceeding
culminating in the judgment. Under this rule
it is proper to consider the pleadings, and the
issues raised thereby, as well as the findings
of the court or verdict of the jury. The application of these rules results in a construction
reached in light of the situation of the court,
what was before it, and the accompanying circumstances."
The foregoing rule is well established in the law.
Bailey v. Superior Court in and for Shasta County
(Calif.), 297 P.2d 795 (1956); Graham v. Graham,
(Calif.), 345 P.2d 316 (1959); In re Careaga's Estate, (Calif.),393 P.2d 415 (1964); Quigley v. McIntosh (Mont.), 103 P.2d 1067 (1940); Dunham v.
Stitzberg (N.M.), 201 P.2d 1000 ( 1948) ; Filtsch v.
Sipe (Okla.), 178 P.2d 612 (1946); Russell v. Freeman (Okla.), 214 P.2d 439 (1949); Lemons v. Lemons (Okla.), 238 P.2d 790 (1951); Callan v. Callan
(Wash.), 468 P.2d 456 ( 1970).
11

In the instant case the trial court was of the
view that paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree
is ambiguous (Tr. 10). Defendants say here that it
is ambiguous. Provo City took the position in the lower court that paragraph 4 ( c) is ambiguous, and effectively concedes that point here in spite of its assertions to the contrary. The ambiguity is further
pointed up by the diametrically opposite interpretations placed thereon by the parties themselves. Accordingly, we submit that under the well established
rule of construction the trial court properly resorted
to 'those portions of the rectlrd of Civil 2888 presented
to it by the parties herein to interpret the meaning of
paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree.
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT INTERPRETING PARAGRAPH 4(c) OF THE
PROVO RIVER DECREE AS A NON-CONSUMPTIVE POWER USE IS CORRECT AND
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND RECORD HEREIN.

The documentation from the records and files
of Civil 2888 submitted by defendants in support of
their Motion For Summary Judgment traces the record references of the award culminating in paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree and clearly
establishes that award as a power right only. 'The
first notable reference developed during the pendency of the trial of Civil 2888 where the then Provo
River Water Commissioner submitted to the court his
proposed distribution for Utah valley during the 1917
12

season ( R. 92, 93) . The proposed distribution to
Provo City was tabulated in four categories, to-wit:
(a)
( b)
( c)
( d)

Provo City Waterworks
Provo City Acreage
Provo City Lots
Factory Race

The allotments under (a) were fixed quantities
of 3 second feet during the period from June 20 to
July 20 and 5 second feet during the period July 20
to September 1. Categories ( b) and ( c) oovering
Provo City's Acreage and Lots specified the respective acreages and duties (acres per second foot) and
corresponding quantities of flow in second feet. The
quantity df flow under (d) was fixed at 13.75 second
feet during the period June 20 to July 20 and 14.00
second feet during the period July 20 to September 1,
with no acreage or duty specified. All other irrigation uses tabulated for the remaining users specified
acreages and duties (R. 92, 93).
On November 26, 1917 C. W. Morse, Judge pro
tern, made and entered his ''Decision," the material
portion of which was made a part of the record herein (R. 94-100, incl.). Under paragraph 4 thereof
Provo City was awarded irrigation water :for 2058.6
farm acres and 300 acres of city lots, for which the
quantities of flow awarded were based upon speci"'.
fied duties (acres per second foot) during the several
fixed periods ( R. 95) , as were all other irrigation
tights ( R. 95-98, incl.). 'The award for the irrigation
13

of the 2058.6 acres of farm land was carried over into
paragraph 58(a) of the Findings Of Fact (R. 113)
and paragraph 4 (a) of the Provo River Decree ( R.
116), both dated May 2, 1921 (R. 115, 129). The
award for the irrigation of the Provo City lots was
subsequently increased to 499.91 acres, with corresponding increases in flows based upon the du'ties specified, and was carried over into paragraph 58(b) of
the Findings Of Fact (R. 113) and paragraph 4(b)
of the Provo River Decree (R. 116).
Under paragraph 17 of the 1917 Decision Provo City was awarded 4 cubic f:eet per second for municipal purposes through its waterworks system (R.
98) and 13.75 second feet of water during the irrigation season for power purposes theretofore used
by the mill rights upon the factory race and other
races within the City (R. 98). In addition thereto
Provo City was awarded sufficient water during the
non-irrigating season to supply the reasonable necessities of all such power users, not to exceed 65 cubic
feet per second, subject 'to the storage rights of the
other parties (R. 98). The award for municipal purposes was carried over into paragraph 58 ( e) of the
Findings Of Fact (R. 113) and paragraph 4(e) of
the Provo River Decree (R. 116). The award for
power use during the non-irrigating season was carried over into paragraph 58(d) of the Findings Of
Fact (R. 113) and paragraph 4 ( d) of the Provo River Decree (R. 116).
During the post 1917 Decision proceedings and
14

by stipulation in open court on September 4, 1918 between the there plaintiff, Provo Reservoir Company,
and Provo City the foregoing 13. 75 second feet was
changed to 16.5 second feet (R. 103), which was specifically identified therein as
'QMR. JACOB EVANS: It is the power
right water." (Italics ours.)
The substitution of 16.5 second feet for 13.75
second feet by the above stipulation was subsequently called to the then trial court's attention by Mr. F.
S. Richards, counsel for Provo City (R. 104) on at
least two occasions (R. 105, 106, 112A). Since the
foregoing stipulation was not joined in by the other
parties to Civil 2888 Mr. F. S. Richards, then attorney
for Provo City, offered evidence to show that the
13.75 second feet would not turn the machinery of
the mills and that the 16.5 second feet was essential
for that purpose (R. 106) such that the evidence
would support a finding thereon and would bind the
other parties. Thereupon the witnesses Bostaph and
Stewart were re-called to so testify under the direct
examination of Mr. C. C. Richards, then attorney for
Provo City (R. 106-108, incl.). And it should be noted that the entire testimony of both witnesses related only to the use of water to operate the machinery
of the mills and nothing was said about the need for
or the use of the 16.5 second feet for irrigation purposes.
During the post 1917 Decision proceedings T. F.
Wentz, then Provo River Water Commissioner, in
15·
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testifying to the distribution of the waters under the
tenta:tive Decree differentiated between the waters I
delivered to Provio City for irrigation and power purposes. Thus he stated that the waters measured for
irrigation purposes did not include the waters delivered through the factory race for power purposes (R.
llOA).

1,

The foregoing award for power purposes during the irrigation season under paragraph 17 of the
1917 Decision, as modified by the above stipulation
on September 4, 1918 and the evidence offered by
Provo City in support thereof, was carried over into
and became paragraph 58 ( c) of the Findings Of
Fact (R. 113) and paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree (R. 116), both dated May 2, 1921.
On page 9 of Appellant's Brief it argues that the
use granted to Provo City in the 16.5 second feet of
water was a dual use of irrigation and generation of
power and that any other contention is inconsistent
with the express wording of the Provo River Decree.
To support its argument, Provo City argues under
its Point III (a) that the court should look only to
the language of paragraph 4 ( c), and argues under
its Point III (b) that since the Decree merely confirms prior existing rights the reference therein to
the past use for irrigation purposes and for the generation of power confirmed the right to use the water
:for both purposes. Next Provo City argues under its
Point III ( c) that paragraph 58 ( c) of the Findings
Of Fact (which is almost identical to paragraph
16

4 ( c) of the Decree) supports that view. Thus Provo
City bases its whole argument on the language of
paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree and completely ignores paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) thereof.
Yet the terms of the Decree should be construed as a
whole so as to give ·effect to all of its terms if possible.
Hubble v. Cache County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 123
Utah 405, 259 P.2d 893 (1953). What Provo City
is really saying is that we must look only to the language of paragraph 4 ( c) for its meaning and we
must not concern ourselves with the other rights
awarded to Provo City under paragraph 4 of the Decree.
Our response thereto is that Provo City thereby
wholly ignores the singularly most important fact
that paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Decree award
a full water right for all of Provo City's irrigated
lands, both farm acreage and city lots, with a most
liberal duty. Furthermore, had it been intended to
award Provo City the use of the 16.5 second feet for
irrigation purposes paragraph 4 ( c) of the Decree
would have fixed the acreage and duties with a variable flow based thereon, as do paragraphs 4 (a) and
4 (b) and as do all other awards for irrigation purposes within the whole Provo division save and except
for two isolated Provo Canyon rights.
When interpreting a decree the purpose and object of the litigation which terminated in the decree
must be analyzed. Ophir Creek Water Company v.
Ophir Hill Consol. Mining Co., 61 Utah 551, 216 P.
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490 ( 1923). Here the whole purpose of the Provo
River Decree was to determine and fix the rights of
the parties thereto and provide for a method of
apportioning the waters of the Provo River among
them. The very foundation of the whole Decree was
the duty of water, for that determined beneficial use.
The duty of water, when applied to the irrigated acreages, fixed the quantities of water to which the irrigation users were entitled.
Accordingly, under both paragraph 4 of the 1917
Decision ( R. 95) and under paragraphs 4 (a) and
4(b) of the 1921 Decree (R. 116) Provo City was
awarded a duty of 57 to 70 acres per second foot for
all of its farm acreage and a flat 50 acres per second
foot for all of its city lots from May 10 to September
1. Obviously Provo City had no other irrigated acreage. Those quantities were, and had to be all of the
irrigation waters awarded to 'Provo City.
The post 1917 Decision proceedings made very
clear that the court was firm in its views on the duty.
'Thus, in commenting on the duty generally, the then
trial court stated in substance that its award of 50
or 57 acre duty was the lowest awarded in any case
the court had ever tried, of which there were a great
many, and in so doing made an award more liberal
than any other litigant the court had to deal with (R.
142, 143). And the court there noted that the duty
of 50 or 57 acres was about as abundant with reference to the water as could be made (R. 143). How
then can it be said that the court intended to award
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Provo City a bonus of 16.5 second feet of water for
irrigation purposes?
More important here is the fact that the trial
court in Civil 2888 rejected the very argument here
asserted by Provo City that paragraph 4{c) awards
a dual use of the 16.5 second feet for both irrigation
and power purposes. 'Thus following the 1917 Decision Provo City applied to the court to re-open the
case with reference to the duty of water. At the hearing on the City's application counsel for the City suggested that inasmuch as the court awarded Provo
City 13.75 second feet for power purposes it must
be in the mind of the court that the waters be applied
for power purposes during the daytime and applied
to irrigation purposes during the nightime because
the City needed at least 35 second feet or its equivalent for six days in a week (R. 144, underscoring
therein ours) . In response thereto the trial court
denied Provo City's application and rejected such
contention, wherein it stated:
"THE COURT: I have felt, gentlemen,
that the court gave the city and the Lake Bottom land and the Provo Bench and these lands
a high duty of water; that I gave them an exceedingly generous allowance of water. I felt
that way, I may be mistaken, but I felt that
way. I felt the court gave every drop of water,
or more, than the most liberal construction of
the evidence would justify or authorize the
court to give ... " (R. 144, underscoring therein ours).
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And further stated:
" ... but as to the duty of water, the court
has placed it so low and given such a large
quantity of water I would not feel a discussion
of that would really be a benefit. When you
come to put six to ten feet of water upon land
in a season it is an enormously low duty for
the water, so tha:t your application to reopen
the case with reference to the duty of water
will be denied, and you may have an exception
in the record for it." (R. 145, underscoring
therein ours) .
Thereupon Provo City noted its exception to the
court's ruling. And it is noteworthy that Provo City
was subsequently awarded in excess of 35 second feet
for irrigation purposes under paragraph 4 (a) and
4 (b) combined in the 1921 Provo River Decree.
N'Owhere in the Appellant's Brief does it state
which lands it claims the right to irrigate with the
16.5 second feet under paragraph 4 ( c). That paragraph does not specify acreages or a duty in addition
to those provided for under paragraphs 4 (a) and
4 (b) which obviously included all of Provo City's
irrigated lands. Provo City certainly could not use the
16.5 second feet on the lands covered by paragraphs
4 (a) and 4 ( b) in face of the language of the trial
court in Civil 2888 quoted above. Those lands have
been awarded a full water right with an exceedingly
generous allowance of water. To say that Provo City
is entitled to use an additional 16.5 second feet of
water on top of the liberal awards made under paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) would give Provo City 35% to
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45 % more water per acre than any other award. And
to deliver to Provo City an additional approximately
5,500 acre feet (16.5 second feet for 165 days) for
use on lands which the trial court in Civil 2888 generously awarded 6 to 10 feet (in depth) per season
would not only do violence to our fundamental concept of beneficial use of water but would abrogate the
duty basis upon which the entire Provo River Decree
is founded.
Next Provo City argues under Point IV (a) of
its Brie:f that if paragraph 4 ( c) had awarded water
for power use only it would have contained restrictive language as did other power rights, notably the
award to Provo Pressed Brick Company under paragraph 32 of the Provo River Decree (R. 161). Our
response is that the Provo Pressed Brick Company
was entitled to use for its power purposes the waters
used by Provo City and the mill owners, including the
16.5 second feet, as an additional use of those waters
and Provo Pressed Brick Company was required then
to return such waters to the channels without substantial diminution in quantity or any deterioration
in quality.
Then Provo City argues under Point IV (b) of
its Brief that if paragraph 4 ( c) had awarded water
for power purposes only there would have be·en no
reason for restricting it to the irrigation season. That
reason is obvious. The irrigation rights make up the
great bulk of the Decree. Obviously the apportionment of the waters of the Provo River during the
21

\

I

irrigatiDn season is primarily what the Decree was
in tended to settle. And so the trial court purposely
divided the power use of Provo City into the two periods of the irrigation season under paragraph 4 (c)
when the power uses were in competition with all of
the irrigation uses and into the non-irrigating season
under paragraph 4 ( d) when there was no like competition. Paragraph 4 ( c) limited Provo City's power
use to 16.5 second feet when in competition with the
irrigation uses in the lower reaches, and paragraph
4 ( d) awarded sufficient water to supply the mill
owners during the non-irrigating season with a maximum of 65 second feet when like competition did not
exist, subject only to the storage rights in the upper
reaches.
Be that as it may, the trial court expressly divided the Provo City power rights into the two periods.
This it unequivocally did in its 1917 Decision, and it
was specifically carried over into 'its 1921 Decree.
Having done so, such specific provisions override the
general provisions of paragraph 124 of the Decree
(R. 163).
Appellant concludes on page 17 of its Brief that
in the final analysis there is no more reason to contend that paragraph 4 ( c) of the Decree provides for
an exclusive use for power purposes than for an exclusive use for irrigation purposes. Such conclusion
might have some logic if we looked only to the language of paragraph 4 ( c) and closed our eyes to the
remaining rights of Provo City awarded under the
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provisions of paragraph 4. However, when we look
to the record of Civil 2888, as we must, the meaning
of paragraph 4 ( c) becomes clear and the conclusion
is inescapable that the court thereby awarded to Provo City the right to use the 16.5 second feet for power
purposes only.
In addition to the above, the special method of
assessment to Provo City for its power rights along
the factory race provided for in paragraph 84 of the
1917 Decision (R. 99) as carried over into paragraph
169 of the Provo River Decree (R. 114) gives further
support to this conclusion. Paragraph 169 provides
in substance that the assessment of Provo City for its
power rights along the factory race shall be fixed by
the quantity of Class A water herein found to this use
multiplied by 165. Such special assessment is distinguished from the assessment for irrigation uses,
which is there fixed by the product of the area of land
irrigated multiplied by the length of the season of
use divided by the duty of water on the 15th day of
July. Thus it would be impossible to apply the irrigation assessment to paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree since it lacks the fundamental factors of
irrigated area and duty.
The sum and substance of the difference in position between the parties hereto is that Provo City
here seeks to limit the inquiry to the language of paragraph 4 ( c) by seizing upon the reference therein to
a past use of such waters by Provo City for irrigation
purposes and argues therefrom that such language
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constitutes an award for irrigation purposes. Defendants on the other hand take the position that such
language is but a general reference to a past use and
does not constitute an award for irrigation purposes.
And since paragraph 4 ( c) is ambiguous and unclear
as to the intended use of such award we must look to
the remaining provisions of the Decree which bear
upon the meaning of paragraph 4 ( c) and look to the
record of Civil 2888 to ascertain therefrom the in•
tended use thereunder.
The step by step process in the proceedings of
Civil 2888 which led to paragraph 4 ( c), viewed in
light of paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b), and the method
of assessment under paragraph 169 of the Provo River Decree leaves no room for doubt that paragraph
4 ( c) is an award for power purposes only. The State
Engineer reached this conclusion when he was initially called upon to decide the matter for distribution
purposes, as did the trial court on the evidence presented by the parties herein in its review of the State
Engineer's decision. We respectfully submit that the
trial court's interpretation of paragraph 4 ( c) is in
all respects correct and is clearly supported by the
evidence and record in this case. Accordingly, its
Judgment made and entered herein must be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE STATE
ENGINEER IS CORRECT AND IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND RECORD HEREIN.
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The controversy underlying this action is the
proper distribution of the waters of the Provo River
under paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree.
Initially the State Engineer was called upon to give
direction to the Provo River Water Commissioner on
how to distribute such water. To do so the State Engineer was required to interpret paragraph 4(c).
This the State Engineer did in his Decision dated
May 1, 1970, whereby he directed the Water Commissioner 'to deliver the 16.5 second feet to Provo City
thereunder only when Provo City can utilize the flow
for a non- consumptive power use. In explanation
therefor he expressed his opinion that the award under paragraph 4 ( c) was for power use only.
Provo City took issue with that directive and
filed this action in the District Court to review that
Decision pursuant to Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as a trial de novo in accordance with
the provisions of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The trial court entered its Judgment affirming the Decision of the State Engineer, and by
its Judgment interpreted paragraph 4(c) as an
award for power use only to be delivered to Provo
City only when it can utilize that flow for a nonconsumptive power use.
Neither the State Engineer nor the District
Oourt purported to re-adjudicate the Provo City water right, and so the cases cited on pages 9 and 10 of
Appellant's Brief are simply not in point. The District Court did not purport to change or modify the
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award or to change the meaning thereot It simply
interpreted paragraph 4 ( c) as adjudicated by the
court in Civil 2888 to ascertain the meaning thereof,
and ordered the delivery of the water in accordance
therewith to settle this controversy and put the matter to rest. For the trial court to simply order that the
water be delivered as awarded in paragraph 4(c)
without interpreting what it means would have accomplished nothing and the parties would have been
right back to where they started.
We have no quarrel with the proposition that the
Sta:te Engineer cannot adjudicate v e s t e d water
rights. However, having the statutory duty and responsibility for the division and distribution of the
waters of this State to carry into effect the judgments
of the courts in that regard (Section 73-5-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953) he is often called upon to interpret those judgments. When he does his decisions
do not adjudicate the law or the facts in issue nor do
his decisions become the law of the case, res adjudicata or binding precedent on the law in future cases.
However, the Judgments of the court entered upon
a review of the State Engineer's Decision become an
adjudication of a court acting as such and become the
law of the case, res adjudicata and the binding precedents on the law the same as all other Judgments
East Bench Irrigation Company v. State, 5 Utah 2d
235, 300 P.2d 603 (1956). That is precisely the posture of the instant case.
We submit that the Judgment of the trial court
26
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was in all respects correct and proper. Having correctly interpreted paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River
Decree to be an award for power purposes only, as
did the State Engineer, it was incumbent on the trial
court to affirm the Decision of the State Engineer
and order that the 16.5 second feet be delivered to
Provo City only when it can utilize the same for nonconsumptive power purposes. That is precisely what
the trial court did here. Accordingly, we respectfully
submit that the Judgment of the trial court must in
all respects be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The controversy here is over the proper distribution of water awarded under paragraph 4(c) of
the Provo River Decree. Decisive thereof is the interpretation of that award, which is purely a question
of law for the court to decide. The controversy was
submitted to the trial court on mutual Motions For
Summary Judgment, supported by documentation extracted from the record of Civil 2888 by both sides
as the agreed upon record in this case.
The trial court entered its Summary Judgment
in favor of defendants, affirming the Decision of the
State Engineer and adjudging that the award to Provo City under paragraph 4 ( c) is for power purposes
only and shall be delivered to Provo City only when it
can use it for a non-consumptive power use.
Provo City contends here that paragraph 4 ( c)
is not ambiguous and would limit the inquiry to the
27

language thereof, which is contrary to the position it
took in the trial court. Defendants here contend, as
they did below, that paragraph 4 ( c) is ambiguous
and we must look to the Provo River Decree as a
whole and the material part of the record of Civil
2888 underlying the Decree to interpret its meaning.
The step by step process in the proceedings of Civil
2888 which culminated in paragraph 4 ( c) of the
Provo River Decree leaves no room for doubt that the
award made therein is for power purposes only.
To say that such award granted Provo City an
additional 16.5 second feet of water for irrigation
purposes with no acreage or duty specified not only
conflicts with paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) but would
award to Provo City an excessive quantity of water
for irrigation purposes and would undermine the
very foundation of the Provo River Decree, i.e., the
duty of water. The trial court concluded otherwise,
and properly so, as did the State Engineer in the first
instance.
The Judgment of the trial court is clearly supported by the record in this case, and we respectfully
submit must in all respects be affirmed.
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